This paper analyzes the effects of consumption externalities on optimal taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. If public and private goods are Hicksian complements and no lump sum taxes are available, the second-best level of public good provision can exceed the first-best level. In contrast to economies without externalities, this result even holds for Cobb-Douglas economies with homogeneous agents. Heterogeneity of agents raises the second-best commodity tax rate due to equity considerations, but lowers the tax rate due to the concern for externality-correction.
Introduction
This paper addresses the effects of a consumption externality on optimal commodity taxation (many person Ramsey rule), the social cost of public good provision (Pigovian rule property), and the optimal level of public good provision (Pigovian level property). The paper is motivated by the recent literature on consumption externalities and happiness.
Consumption externalities have attracted the attention of economists for centuries.
Many classical economists, for instance, assumed that the quest for status -a consumption externality -is an important component of the pursuit of self-interest (Kern, 2001 ).
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More recently, a rapidly growing body of literature addresses the paradoxical development of income and happiness. While real per capita disposable income has substantially increased over the last fifty years, there is no trend in subjective well-being. The fact that raising income of all does not increase happiness of all (Easterlin 1995 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith notes: "Though it is in order to supply the necessities and conveniences of the body that the advantages of external fortune are originally recommended to us, yet we cannot live long in the world without perceiving that the respect of our equals, our credit and rank in the society we live in, depend very much upon the degree in which we possess, or are supposed to possess those advantages. The desire of becoming the proper objects of this respect ... is perhaps the strongest of all our desires." (Smith 1759 , pp. 348-349) 2 A number of further studies offer strong evidence of the existence of consumption externalities. in the first-best optimum. This paper contributes to the prior literature in that it identifies consumption externalities as a further source for "Pigovian level reversal." That is, in the presence of a negative consumption externality, the second-best level of public good provision may be larger than the first-best level. To gain intuition, suppose lump-sum taxes or transfers are not available to the public sector. If the revenue raised by applying the first-best commodity tax rate exceeds the funds required to finance the first-best level of the public good, the second-best commodity tax rate is lower than the first-best rate. In this situation, a marginal increase of the commodity tax (in public good provision) lowers the distortion introduced by the negative consumption externality.
As a result, the second-best level of public good provision exceeds the first-best level.
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This paper also illustrates the possibility of "Pigovian level reversal" by an economy populated with homogeneous agents with Cobb-Douglas preferences. For such an economy without consumption externalities, Wilson (1991a) demonstrates that the second-best level of public good provision is always lower than the first-best level. In the presence of a negative consumption externality, however, the paper shows that the second-best level of public good provision can exceed the first-best level.
In addition, the paper contributes to the prior literature in that it presents a generalized Ramsey rule. The Ramsey rule reveals that a consumption externality interacts with heterogeneity of agents in a nontrivial and interesting way. Suppose, in addition to a commodity tax, only a poll tax is available to the public sector.
For reasons of equity (high consumption agents should be discouraged), heterogeneity tends to increase the optimal commodity tax rate. In the presence of a negative consumption externality, low consumption agents -who respond the most to transfers received -contribute the most to the negative externality at the margin. For this reason, heterogeneity tends to lower the optimal commodity tax rate (thereby transfers paid) due to the externality. That is, if agents are heterogeneous, distributional considerations and externality effects -in connection with heterogeneity -represent a tradeoff between equity and efficiency. Section 2 of this paper presents the economy's private and public sectors, introduces the consumption externality, and discusses the government's instruments under several (second-best) restrictions. Section 3 develops a generalized many person Ramsey rule. Section 4 analyzes the effects of consumption externalities on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. Section 5 presents an example of "Pigovian level reversal" for an economy with homogeneous agents. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes the paper. The appendix contains proofs and mathematical results that support the analysis of the main text.
The Economy
We consider an economy with a continuum of agents i ∈ I ≡ [0, 1] with the distribution function F (i). Agents may differ with respect to preferences or income. The aim of allowing for such differences is to motivate the inclusion of consumption externalities based on the economy's mean level of consumption.
The Private Sector
We extend King's (1986) framework by introducing a consumption externality. An agent has preferences over a consumption good, x, leisure, l, a pure public good, g, and a consumption reference level,x, that is considered to be exogenous by an individual agent:
An agent's indirect utility function is given by:
where q is the consumer price of the consumption good, and y is the agent's full income (i.e., the value of labor endowment).
7 Equation (2) defines the maximum level of utility that an agent can obtain, given the price of the consumption good, full income, the level of public good provision, and the consumption reference level. 6 The framework can easily be extended to any number of consumption goods. The results presented below are not affected by consideration of many consumption goods. 7 We choose l to represent the numeraire good and set the wage rate equal to unity.
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The consumption reference level is given by the mean consumption level:
It gives rise to a consumption externality. The consumption reference level,x, may capture, for example, preferences related to conspicuous consumption or to a positive network externality. We characterize consumption externalities according to the impact of the consumption reference level on indirect utility: 
Proof. See appendix.
Consider the canonical example of a negative consumption externality: keeping up with the Joneses preferences. A keeping up with the Joneses externality is defined by: u xx > 0 (see Dupor and Liu 2003) . In this case, the consumption reference level,
x, raises the marginal utility of individual consumption. That is, for given (q, g, y), optimal individual consumption rises inx. As one's consumption is subject to the keeping up with the Joneses externality, an additional unit of consumption not only satisfies one's direct benefit of consumption but also one's indirect benefit of keeping up with (or being better than) the Joneses. Consequently, an agent is willing to give up more units of leisure for an additional unit of consumption in the presence of a keeping up with the Joneses externality.
It is important to emphasize that a negative consumption externality does not generally imply xx > 0, and a positive consumption externality does not generally imply xx < 0. Consider, for example, a positive network externality (a high mean level of cell phone users in a given country). In this situation, the marginal rate of 8 A bar is used to denote the mean level of a variable throughout. Subscripts are used to denote partial derivatives with respect to the subscripted variable(s).
substitution of consumption for leisure rises inx, which, by Lemma 1, implies xx > 0.
Similarly, in case of a negative congestion externality (e.g., a high mean level of car users in a given road network),x, lowers the marginal utility of consumption for leisure. By Lemma 1, xx < 0. These examples suggest that a positive consumption externality is associated with xx > 0, while a negative consumption externality is associated with xx < 0. But a keeping up with the Joneses externality represents a prominent exception to this rule.
For a given level of utility,v, the willingness to pay for a marginal unit of g is given by:
where the latter term follows from differentiating the equation v(.) =v with respect to g.
We define an agent's money metric utility (equivalent income), y e (i), as the level of income which -at the reference values (q 
where f (.) is itself an indirect utility function for the agent under consideration. Following King (1986), we will employ f (.) in the social welfare function below. Considering conditional demand of the consumption good and the willingness to pay, Roy's identities -for givenx -yield:
Compensated demand (indexed by superscript c) is given by:
We finally state the Slutsky equations (again for givenx): 
That is, Hicksian substitutability (complementarity) between x and g implies that the compensated willingness to pay for the public good rises (declines) in q.
The Public Sector
An individual agent considers the consumption reference level,x, as given. The government, however, takes the impact of its policy instruments on the consumption reference level into account.
Before discussing the instruments of the public sector, a technical note of the effects of changes in z ∈ {y, q, g} on the consumption reference level suggests itself. Letx z ≡ i∈I ∂ x(i, q, y, g,x)/∂ z dF (i) denote the aggregate impact of a rise in all agents' z ∈ {y, q, g} by a marginal unit on average consumption -for a given level ofx. That is,
x z does not capture the effect of a change inx.
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Next, let η ≡ i∈I xx(i, q, g, y,x) dF (i) capture the aggregate impact (via the consumption externality) of a change in the consumption reference level on consumption demand. Then:
Derivative (9) shows the effect of a rise in z ∈ {y, q, g} on the consumption reference level. In the presence of a consumption externality, all agents respond to the change in the consumption reference level. This "indirect" effect is accounted for by the term
. The regularity condition, η < 1, ensures that the indirect effect does not dominate the direct effect of the change in z.
Remark. A consumption externality may but need not imply that η = 0. Consider utility function (1) . If (x, l) is weakly separable fromx, then xx = 0, according 9 Throughout the paper, a tilde indicates the aggregate (average) change of a variable -for a given value ofx (that is, not accounting for the externality effect via the change inx).
10 From (3) define:
y) defines an implicit function inx, and: (dx)/(dz) = −(∂ G/∂ z)/(∂ G/∂x).
to Lemma 1. Hence, η = 0 in spite of the consumption externality. That is, a consumption externality implies vx = 0, but it does not generally imply: η = 0. In
The public sector. The public sector controls the following instruments: a commodity tax τ = q − p, the level of a public good, g, and lump sum taxes (transfers), t(i) > 0 (t(i) < 0), where p represents the constant marginal production cost of x. Per capita revenue, r, is given by: r = t + τx, where t = i∈I t(i) d F (i). We assume a constant average production cost of the public good, c. The government budget constraint is given by:
The government chooses its instruments such as to maximize an additively separable social welfare function, defined over individual levels of equivalent income:
where W (.) is concave and increasing in y e (i). The concavity of W (.) describes the degree of aversion to inequality in money metric utility levels, y e (i).
Taking into consideration (3), the government's Lagrangian becomes:
where the Lagrange multiplier measures the social evaluation of an additional unit of government revenues. In the first-best optimum, the government chooses (τ, g, t(i)) such as to maximize (12) . In the second-best optimum, the government faces one of the following three constraints:
All constraints prevent the government from introducing personalized lump sum taxes (transfers). A poll tax is available, however, under constraint C1. In addition, constraint C2 restrains the government from imposing lump-sum taxes on agents. Finally, constraint C3 precludes the government from imposing any lump-sum taxes or transfers.
We now derive the necessary first-order conditions for the (first-best) optimal levels of the government's instruments. We use (9) together with the facts that
i∈I
In the first-best optimum, a rise in agent i's transfer implies:
which follows from dL/dt(i) = 0, division by the density of i, and (9).
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Equations (13) to (16) hold in a first-best optimum. In a second-best optimum, (13) and (14) are generally satisfied. Under all constraints, (16) does not hold (no individualized lump sum taxes or transfers are available). In addition, under constraint C2, first order condition (15) holds as a weak inequality (≤). Under constraint C3, (15) is not applicable.
By defining both the net social marginal utility of income, b(i)
, and an externality term, , we can conveniently derive the Ramsey-and Pigou rules:
In (17), the first term on the right hand side shows the social evaluation of the change in agent i's utility due to a transfer of $1. The second term on the right hand side shows the change in commodity tax payments to the government. The mean level of the net social marginal utility of income is given byb.
The externality term is given by:
Without an externality, = 0. According to Definition 1, < 0 ( > 0) in the presence of a negative (positive) consumption externality.
By employingb and , first order condition (15) yields:
The (mean) net social marginal utility of income can be interpreted as the marginal benefit to cost ratio of increasing a uniform lump sum transfer by a marginal unit. In the presence of a negative consumption externality, this ratio exceeds unity. With the marginal benefit declining in income, the negative consumption externality lowers the (first-best) level of the lump sum transfer. Intuitively, in the presence of a negative consumption externality, raising the transfer incurs an additional cost to all agents in terms of a rise in the consumption reference level.
In a second-best optimum, when t is restricted to be non-positive,b * * ≤b * .
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Starting from t = 0, raising the lump sum transfer by a marginal unit would raise the mean marginal benefit by less than cost. The second-best restriction (t ≤ 0), if binding, forces the government to set t = 0. Thereby, the net social marginal utility of income is lower in a second-best-than a first-best optimum.
Ramsey Rule
Let φ mn denote the covariance between variables m(i) and n(i).
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As shown in the appendix, first order condition (13) yields the generalized many person Ramsey rule:
wheres xx ≡ i∈I s xx (i) dF (i), and φ xyx ≡ Cov
. The approximate proportionate change in compensated demand of the consumption good depends onb, the covariances φ bx , φ x y x , and the externality. We will interpret the covariance term 12 In what follows, an asterisk refers (two asterisks refer) to the first-best (second-best) allocation.
φ bx /x as concern for equity and the term φ xyx as concern for externality-correction (as related to the heterogeneity of agents).
Lemma 2 In a first-best optimum
The first-best (Pigovian) tax rate, τ * , equals the negative of the externality term. That is, τ * > 0 (τ * < 0) in the presence of a negative (positive) consumption externality.
Ramsey rule (21) reveals two important results, one for the case of homogeneous agents and the other for the case of heterogeneous agents.
Proposition 1 (Homogeneous Agents) Consider a negative consumption exter-
In Proposition 1, the sign of t * is exogenous. The sign clearly depends on both the revenue requirement for financing the optimal level of the public good and the revenue earned from applying the (corrective) first-best tax rate on consumption.
14 Statement (i) shows that, as long as the second-best constraint C2 is not binding -that is, as long as the optimal lump sum tax is negative -first-best and second-best optima coincide. If the revenue earned from applying the (corrective) first-best tax rate on consumption exceeds the revenue requirement for financing the optimal level of the public good, the excess revenue is rebated to all agents as a lump sum transfer. Once, however, the constraint becomes binding, first order condition (15) -equivalently (20) -holds as a strong inequality (<), implying that a rise in the lump sum tax in order to increase government revenues would be welfare improving. In the second-best optimum, no lump sum tax can be introduced. Instead, the tax on consumption good
x is raised beyond its first-best rate.
14 To determine the sign of t * , we also need the Pigovian rule, which is derived below.
Statement (ii) considers a constraint in addition to C2: no lump sum transfers are available. If this constraint binds, first order condition (15) holds as a strong inequality (>), implying that a rise in the lump sum transfer would be welfare improving, as the "corrective revenue" exceeds the revenue requirement for financing the public good.
As no lump sum transfers can be introduced, the tax on the consumption good is reduced to a rate below its first-best rate.
A In the following, we consider heterogeneous agents. If the social marginal utility of income is decreasing in income and the consumption level is increasing in income, covariance φ bx will be negative. This is the main case considered below.
Proposition 2 (Heterogeneous Agents) Suppose φ bx < 0. Consider constraint C1, and a negative consumption externality.
If φ x y x < 0, heterogeneity raises the second-best commodity tax rate due to the concern for equity, while heterogeneity lowers the second-best commodity tax rate due to the concern for externality-correction.
Proof. Under constraint C1 a poll tax is available, thus, first order condition (20) holds as equality. Ramsey rule (21) becomes:
In the presence of a negative consumption externality, < 0.
The proposition considers the case in which φ bx < 0. The more consumption is concentrated among high income agents (with a low social evaluation), the higher is the optimal reduction in compensated demand due to the introduction of the commodity tax. High income agents pay an above average share of the commodity tax revenue that is uniformly redistributed among all agents, benefiting agents with a high social evaluation the most. Thus, the concern for equity raises τ beyond its first-best level.
If φ xyx < 0, the agents with the lowest consumption (income) levels respond the most to an increase in transfers. That is, the marginal contribution to the consumption externality is the largest for agents with the lowest income levels. A rise of the commodity tax rate beyond its first-best level -e.g., for equity reasons -raises the poll transfer (or lowers the poll tax). The commodity tax is paid mainly by high-income agents, but the transfers are proportionally received by all agents. Thus, a rise of the commodity tax rate generates a redistribution towards low-income agents, whose marginal contribution to the negative consumption externality is the strongest. For this reason, the concern for externality-correction lowers the second-best commodity tax rate.
The concerns for equity and externality-correction reveal a heterogeneity-related equity-efficiency tradeoff. A marginal increase in the commodity tax rate (beyond its first-best level) advances equity via redistribution. However, just because of redistribution towards low-income agents, the marginal rise in the commodity tax rate induces agents to raise consumption, thereby extending the consumption reference level beyond its optimal level. The second-best level of the commodity tax rate exceeds the first-best level only if the concern for equity is stronger than the concern for externality-correction. It is an empirical matter, whether or not this is the case.
We conclude this section with three brief remarks. First, if φ x y x > 0, the concerns for equity and externality-correction reenforce each other. This seems to be an unlikely case, however, as it requires high-income agents to respond the strongest to a marginal rise in transfers. Second, if one of the constraints C2 or C3 bind in addition to C1, the second-best effects discussed in relation to Proposition 1 apply in addition to the second-best effects discussed in relation to Proposition 2. Third, in case of a positive consumption externality, the role of φ xyx is reversed. If φ xyx < 0, both concerns contribute to raising the second-best commodity tax rate.
Pigovian Rule and Pigovian Level Property
The first order condition for the public good provision (14) , combined with Roy's identity (6) and the Slutsky equation for the public good (8), yields the generalized many person Pigovian rule (the derivation is shown in the appendix):
wheres xg ≡ i∈I s xg (i) dF (i), and
The Slutsky terms xg is positive (negative) if the private and public goods are Hicksian complements (substitutes). The left hand side of the Pigovian rule represents the (negative of the) approximate proportionate change in the compensated willingness to pay due to the implementation of the commodity tax (see (7)). It is negatively related with φ bx , and -in the presence of a negative consumption externalitypositively related with φ xyω .
If the willingness to pay rises in income, while the social valuation declines in income, φ bω < 0. In this case, the introduction of the public good raises social inequality, as those agents with the lowest social evaluation have the highest willingness to pay. As the Slutsky term (left hand side of (22)) rises in the covariance,ω q (.) declines in φ bω (that is, the willingness becomes more negative or less positive). This effect tends to be associated with a lower optimal level of public good provision.
Similarly, φ xyω < 0 lowers the social cost of public good provision, in case of a negative consumption externality. The argument parallels the one given in relation to Proposition 2. Agents with the lowest willingness to pay (income) respond the most to a reduction in transfers. The implementation of the commodity tax induces a redistribution from high-income to low-income agents, as argued above. However, a marginal rise in public good provision -by lowering lump sum transfers -reduces the extent of this redistribution. The induced marginal reduction in (externality generating) consumption is larger for low-income than for high-income agents, implying a decline in the consumption reference level. Resources are shifted from the private sector (that is subject to the consumption externality) to the public sector, which lowers the social cost of public good provision.
Combining (22) with the Ramsey rule (21) yields an expression relating the willingness to pay to the social cost of providing the public good:
with H ≡ω 
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The term H accounts for heterogeneity of agents.
Lemma 3
In the first-best optimum, i∈I ω * (i) dF (i) = c.
The lemma shows the Samuelson rule, according to which the "sum" of the marginal rates of substitution of g for l equals the marginal rate of transformation between those goods.
In the following, we discuss Pigovian rule-and level properties in the presence of consumption externalities. To sharpen results, we focus on the case of homogeneous agents: H = 0.
Definition 2
The Pigovian rule property is said to hold if i∈I ω * *
The Pigovian level property is said to hold if
The definition of the Pigovian rule property implies that the social cost of public good provision in the second-best exceeds the social cost in the first-best. It is important to recognize that it is mistaken to assume that a higher social cost of public good provision (in the second-best as compared to the first-best) generally lowers the optimal level of public good provision. That is, the Pigovian rule property does not generally imply the Pigovian level property. As demonstrated by Chang (2000) , the linkage between the social cost of public good provision and its optimal level critically depends on the Hicksian complementarity (substitutability) between the public and private good. 15 Hicksian complementarity and normality of private consumption imply Marshallian complementarity between x and g. Bradford and Hildebrandt (1977) argue that such complementarities exist between, e.g., air safety and air travel, traffic network and private cars, lighthouses and private boating, public tennis courts and tennis rackets, or national defense and ownership of private property.
We defineŝ xg ≡ −s xxω /x > 0. In (23) , ifs xg <ŝ xg , the term in square brackets is negative (dominated by the Pigou effect). If ifs xg >ŝ xg , there is strong Hicksian complementarity between the public and private good, and the term in square brackets is positive (dominated by the provision effect). Ifs xg =ŝ xg the provision effect counterbalances the Pigou effect, and the term in square brackets equals zero. In case (ii), τ * * < τ * , which can only occur under second-best restriction C3 when t * < 0. In this case, a marginal increase of the commodity tax lowers the distortion created by the consumption externality. That is, the Pigou effect lowers the social cost of public good provision. As τ * * < τ * , the provision effect is negative -compared to the first-best optimum, the commodity tax rate is lowered. That is, the provision effect raises the social cost of public good provision. As Hicksian complementarity between the private and public goods is strong enough so that the provision effect dominates the Pigou effect, the social cost of public good provision exceeds the private cost. The reasoning parallels the one given for Proposition 3. In case (i), the Pigou effect raises the cost of public good provision. It is, however, dominated by the provision effect, so that the social cost of public good provision is lower than the private cost.
In case (ii), the Pigou effect lowers the social cost of public good provision. As it dominates the provision effect, the private cost is higher than the social cost of public good provision. Table 1 summarizes the Pigovian rule properties in the presence of a consumption externality. Table 1 ,ω refers to the uncompensated willingness to pay:ω(q, y, g,x). Let x(q, y, g) be the solution tox − i∈I x(i, q, y, g,x) dF (i) = 0 with respect tox. We can then define an "ex post"-version of the willingness to pay:w(q, y, g) ≡ω(q, y, g,x(q, y, g)).
Pigovian level property. For determining the Pigovian level property, we employ the compensated willingness to pay for the public good. Letx 
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The analysis of the Pigovian level property employs the following assumption: In the presence of a negative consumption externality, under second-best restriction C3, the Pigovian level property fails to hold if the first-best commodity tax revenue exceeds the revenue required to finance the optimal level of the public good.
In this case, the Pigovian level property is reversed, and the second-best level of public good provision exceeds the first-best level. In the presence of a negative consumption externality, τ * = − > 0. If the "corrective revenue" exceeds the funds required to finance the first-best level of the public good, t * < 0. Under the second-best restriction C3, however, no lump sum taxes or transfers are available to the public sector. As a consequence, τ * * < τ * , as
shown by Proposition 1. In this situation, a marginal increase of the commodity tax lowers the distortion introduced by the negative consumption externality.
A related argument was introduced, in a more specialized framework, by Wendner and Goulder (2008). They show that the relationship between the first-best and second-best levels of public good provision depends on the sign of the marginal excess burden of a rise in τ . If the marginal excess burden is negative, the second-best level of public good provision exceeds the first-best level. Table 2 summarizes the results. TABLE 2 Pigovian Level Property and Consumption Externalities
Proposition 5 is illustrated by a Cobb-Douglas example below. In the context of an economy without consumption externalities, Wilson (1991a) demonstrates that the Pigovian level property holds if preferences can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function and the public good is normal.
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The example shown below demonstrates that -in the context of an economy with a negative consumption externality -the Pigovian level property can be reversed, even for preferences that can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
An Example with Homogeneous Agents
Consider an economy with identical agents whose preferences are represented by:
where β > 0 represents the strength of the desire for the public good, and 0 < γ < 1 introduces a consumption externality. The strength of the consumption externality increases in γ. As γ > 0, a rise in the consumption reference level lowers utility.
Thereby, (24) represents an example of a negative consumption externality.
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The example is particularly simple, as µx = xx = η = 0.
The indirect utility function becomes:
Roy's identity yields: x(q, y, g,x) =α y/q, andx = x, where strong separability implies independence of x(.) from g.
Calculation of the Hicksian demands yields the following expenditure function:
, and the compensated willingness to pay, −∂ e(.)/∂ g, becomes:
As required by Proposition 5,w 
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Let second-best restriction C3 apply. From the Lagrangian:
the first-and second-best solutions can easily be derived. In the Lagrangian, it is taken into account thatx = x, and the constant marginal production cost of the consumption good is set equal to p = 1.
In the first-best optimum:
, and the optimal public good provision is given by:
In the second-best optimum: higher γ (thereby the corrective tax revenue) and the lower β (thereby the revenue requirement for financing the public good) the more likely is the reversal the Pigovian level property. Formally:
In the absence of a consumption externality γ =β = 0. If β > 0, g * * < g * , as demonstrated by Wilson (1991a) . In the presence of a negative consumption externality, however, if β <β, the corrective first-best revenue exceeds the revenue requirement for financing the public good. As a consequence, τ * * < τ * , and g * * > g * .
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper addresses the effects of consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation, the social cost of public good provision (Pigovian rule property), and the optimal level of public good provision (Pigovian level property). Several of the paper's results deserve comments.
First, not taking heterogeneity effects into account for the moment, the paper shows that in the presence of a negative consumption externality, it is mistaken to assume that the second-best level of provision of the public good necessarily differs from the first-best level. Once available policy instruments include a poll transfer (but not a poll tax), g * * = g * whenever the revenue raised by applying the first-best commodity tax rate does not fall short of the revenue requirement for financing the optimal level of the public good. This case is the more likely the stronger is the negative consumption externality.
If the revenue raised by applying the first-best commodity tax rate is lower than the revenue requirement for financing the optimal level of the public good, a negative consumption externality still lowers the social cost of public good provision and thereby tends to raise the optimal level of provision. Intuitively, the commodity tax not only serves a revenue raising purpose but also an externality correcting purpose.
For this reason, the externality lowers the Pigou effect, thus, the social cost of public good provision.
Second, it is mistaken to assume that heterogeneity unambiguously raises the commodity tax for reasons of equity. In the presence of a negative consumption externality, the paper identifies two opposing heterogeneity-effects on the optimal commodity tax rate. The covariance between the social valuations of agents and their consumption levels tends to raise the optimal commodity tax rate. However, the covariance between the marginal propensity to consume (with respect to a rise in income) and consumption levels tends to lower the optimal commodity tax rate. The agents with the lowest consumption levels -that is, with highest social valuationhave the highest propensity to consume due to an increase in (redistributive) transfers. Thereby, at the margin, they contribute the most to the negative consumption externality. This externality effect requires a lowering of optimal transfers, thereby of the optimal commodity tax rate. It is essentially an empirical matter which one of those two opposing effects dominates. Therefore, it is not generally true that heterogeneity always raises the optimal commodity tax rate for equity considerations. This equity-efficiency tradeoff should be kept in mind for the design of redistributive tax programs.
Third, a negative consumption externality is a potential source for the reversal of the Pigovian level property. In the presence of a negative consumption externality, the second-best level of public good provision may exceed the first-best level, once lump sum taxes and transfers are not available to the public sector. If the preference for the public good is low relative to the strength of the consumption externality, the firstbest corrective revenue may exceed the revenue requirement for financing the optimal public good level. In this case, the commodity tax lowers the distortion introduced by the consumption externality, and the second-best level of public good provision exceeds the first-best level. This result even holds true for an economy populated with homogeneous agents with Cobb-Douglas preferences.
Even under less restrictive policy restrictions, as noted above, a negative consumption externality will tend to raise the second-best level of public good provision by lowering its social cost. In the presence of a negative consumption externality, the transfer of resources from the private sector -that is subject to the negative consumption externality -to the public sector of the economy -that is not associated with a consumption externality -lowers the social cost. This effect should be kept in mind when accessing the social cost of public good provision. Notwithstanding these limitations, I hope this study clarifies the theoretical effects of consumption externalities on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision, and can contribute to future discussions of Pigovian rules and levels. Suppose u(.) is strictly quasiconcave in (x, l). Then, individual consumption is related to the consumption reference level as follows:
Proof. The necessary first order conditions of the utility maximization problem are: It follows:
By applying Cramer's rule:
where the denominator is positive by strict quasiconcavity of the utility function. In first order condition (13) , consider Roy's identity (5) , and the definitions of the externality term (19) and the social marginal utility of income (17) 
Rearranging terms implies:
Considering the definition of covariance φ xyx yields Ramsey rule (21) .
C Proof of Lemma 2. Considering the definition of covariance φ xyω and rearranging terms yields Pigovian rule (22) . 
